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DEMAGOGUERY, DEMOCRATIC DISSENT, AND “RE-VISIONING”
DEMOCRACY
STEVEN R. GOLDZWIG
applaud Professor Roberts-Miller’s call for a new look at demagoguery.
Rather than engage in particular observations and arguments attending
Professor Roberts-Miller’s call, I would like to begin with her closing remarks:
“I am not claiming I have settled the dilemma of rules and inclusion, nor even
to have conclusively demonstrated what demagoguery is, let alone what
should be done about it. My intention is to raise interest in the research project and revivify scholarship on demagoguery.”1
To my mind, one of the most important implications in Professor RobertsMiller’s essay is that a refocused agenda on so-called “demagogic” rhetorical
practices and products may give scholars and public alike a better handle on
“deliberative democracy.”2 While she provides a credible account of why
rhetoricians may have turned from studies focusing on demagoguery, she also
indicates that scholars in other fields seem to have a growing interest precisely
because such studies have great promise in advancing our knowledge of
democratic deliberation.3 One place to begin, however, is to probe some of the
existing rhetorical literature for helpful critiques of discursive formations that
might point more clearly to exactly how rhetoricians have already contributed
to the discussion of discursive democracy.
Professor Roberts-Miller indicated earlier in her essay that part of the
dilemma associated with sparse treatments of demagoguery can actually be
traced back to my 1989 essay on Louis Farrakhan.4 She laments, “It is notable,
however, the extent to which this scholarly project has lapsed; journals in
rhetoric show few or no articles since Steven R. Goldzwig’s 1989 piece on
Farrakhan.”5 While there is some truth to this observation, I think the exceptions to this generalization are important and naming them is actually one way
of acknowledging and advancing Professor Roberts-Miller’s call.
In particular, I believe that current ongoing attempts to understand folks
who have been labeled by scholars and publics alike as “demagogues” are helping us realize new ways of interpreting such rhetors, advancing our knowledge
of oppositional rhetorics and, ultimately, our understanding of the nuances of
our emerging rhetorical democracy. In the brief space allotted for this response,
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I would like to give some examples of current scholarship that support this
argument. While the following exemplars are not meant to be exhaustive nor
necessarily representative of an ongoing major trend in current scholarship,
they seem to me to be demonstrative of the shifting character of the contemporary treatment of demagoguery. Traditional categories and assumptions are
being reformed and retooled, if not supplanted by recent work.
Patricia A. Sullivan points to the need to pay special attention to the unique
contours of African American rhetoric to avoid misinterpreting its thrust and
intent. She indicates that during the 1988 presidential campaign, media coverage of Jesse Jackson’s bid for the presidency “was greeted with frustration by
media representatives and political pundits.”6 These opinion leaders attributed
to Jackson those characteristics we often associate with demagogues and demagoguery, “charg[ing] that he was overly emotional, dishonest, and vague during
presentations on the campaign trail.”7 By rereading Jackson through the culturespecific lens of African American patterns of signification, those negative
public assessments seem much less convincing and more likely a case of misinterpretation. Using as her case study Jackson’s Democratic National Convention
address “Common Ground and Common Sense,” Sullivan demonstrates conclusively that Jackson employed a “speakerly text,” which was ripe with the “double-voiced words and double-voiced discourse” associated with various forms of
African American signification.8 In Sullivan’s account, simple assessments of
demagogic practices are rendered problematic. For example, “‘Lying’ within the
context of the black oral tradition does not necessarily connote dishonesty or
insincerity.”9 Indeed, “from the standpoint of African-American patterns of signification, [Jackson] was using ‘figurative discourse,’ or symbolically adapting
his story for the audience.”10 Thus, the “truth” of the narrative lies in its symbolic
resonance for the intended audience rather than in any particular truth-telling
“in a traditional sense.”11 In like manner, charges of being “overly emotional” are
conclusions often made by whites when they are exposed to African American
discourse, but those judgments are not necessarily shared by black audiences
who may be more interested in a rhetor’s ability to ground his or her argument
in “common sense and personal experience” through various forms of culturebased signification.12 These kinds of differences do matter, especially in our
attempt to interpret and understand the ongoing discourses of a democracy.
Thus culture-specific address and its critical appreciation are dependent on the
norms of the cultural contract in force at the time. Text, context, cultural contract, and norms for performance all play crucially interdependent roles in
determining the quality, value, and ethicality of discursive practices.
The reinterpretation of the so-called “demagogue” also has increased our
knowledge of protest rhetoric. Mark Lawrence McPhail’s 1998 article on Louis
Farrakhan in the Quarterly Journal of Speech is a case in point.13 McPhail seeks
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to amplify earlier work, including my own,14 through a key assumption: “The
manner in which knowledge is conceptualized and articulated in protest
rhetoric often mirrors and thus sustains the very values and norms it calls into
question.”15 In that light, McPhail employs complicity theory in an effort to
extend our understanding of Farrakhan’s discourse. He argues that Farrakhan
employs “racial reasoning in his public discourse” that “relies heavily on
appeals laced with racial essentialism.” As a result, not only does Farrakhan’s
discourse “undermine the powerful possibilities of his message of hope and
atonement,” it tends to “reif[y] and invigorate . . . conflict and division” which,
in turn, has the “potential to reinscribe [negative] social norms, practices, and
values.”16 In essence, McPhail finds Farrakhan fully engaged in a “politics of
complicity” and argues persuasively against any assumption “that oppositional
rhetorics are inherently emancipatory.”17 In Farrakhan, McPhail encounters a
rhetor whose “appeal to racial essentialism, coupled with his exploitation of
the discursive tension between white racism and black resistance, creates a climate of opposition in which the emancipatory possibilities of protest are
obscured and undermined.”18 The larger lesson in the essay is that any “oppositional discourse that fails to interrogate its underlying assumptions too often
remains complicit with those systems of oppression it calls into question.”19
John Arthos Jr. has reinterpreted Farrakhan’s rhetoric as well.20 Like
Sullivan’s treatment of Jesse Jackson, rather than writing Farrakhan off as a
sophist or an ethically suspect rhetorician, Arthos claims that Farrakhan is also
perhaps better interpreted within the framework of African American culture.
In his analysis of Farrakhan’s discourse at the Million Man March, Arthos
encounters a rhetor practicing the “shaman-trickster’s art of misdirection.” In
that light, Farrakhan is evaluated as a “master of the art of ‘gettin ovuh,’” which
was utilized in his call for “black atonement” as a key theme for the march. In
issuing his call in a “double-voice,” Farrakhan assured the black community
that “the most subversive meanings” of his message would indeed be theirs
alone. Thus, Farrakhan offered his audiences the promise of spiritual delivery
while performing the rites of the traditional role of priest-magician. In this
instance, Farrakhan’s discourse wove a complex web, the totality of which was
largely unseen by white audiences. In this way, Arthos, like others involved in
the contemporary reinterpretation of those whose public discourse has been
associated with the term “demagogue” by scholars and public alike, gives us a
new lens with which to investigate an old topic. Therefore, demagoguery is
receiving renewed attention, but the old explanations for so-called demagogic
discourse are being reformulated. These reinterpretations do not necessarily
remove rhetors from charges of demagoguery nor do they necessarily remove
what can seem, to many at least, the production of prejudiced and divisive discursive action in the world. But what they can do and have done is to lend
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additional insight into controversial and often marginalized rhetorical
attempts. In the long run, I firmly believe, such studies enrich our understanding of the complexity of democratic discourse in the United States. As
Arthos notes, “The Janus face of black identity continues to play an important
and productive role in the negotiation of a hostile world. The Million Man
March enacted in an exemplary fashion this very bifurcation.”21 In interrogating these kinds of tension points in our democratic republic, rhetoricians are
engaged in the common scholarly community’s concern with democratic
practices and products. By focusing on how and why different communities
create space both to announce and to reinforce their vision of a better life, we
help to unearth what has previously been unseen and unacknowledged; we
prepare each other for future engagement and growth.
But it is not just in formal speeches delivered by publicly recognized representatives of our various political, social, and religious communities where our
critical learning curve is now in full arc. Rhetoricians who place an emphasis
on “vernacular discourse” or “everyday language” are finding and reinterpreting discursive texts that are helping us refrain from hasty summary judgments
on various rhetors as perpetrators of “highly emotional” or ethically suspect
discourse.22 We are finding that emotion and reason cannot be easily separated
and that displays of emotion can be read in many subtle ways. Indeed, as
Samuel McCormick has indicated, a focus on “everyday talk” can be useful in
“enriching rhetorical studies by providing theorists and critics with access to
paralinguistic markers such as hesitations, repetitions, repairs, intonations,
and emphases” that “bring with them a powerful mode of analyzing the subtle, often fleeting displays of emotion and spur-of-the-moment decisions that
riddle public speech [and] that are omitted when [merely] recording the orator’s words.”23 McCormick suggests that a limited number of rhetorical scholars are now coming to understand that the speech text’s overall influence and
force may be a matter that transcends individual persuasive prowess and
implicates the “audience’s willingness to recycle and revise figural aspects of a
speaker’s discourse in their everyday talk.”24
The focus on “everyday talk” and the “vernacular” is in conformance with
my 1998 call for “critical localism” as a potentially useful locus for rhetorical
criticism.25 A subsequent essay I coauthored with Patricia A. Sullivan enacts the
call for critical localism by interrogating vernacular discursive practices that
could be construed as demagogic without a careful and particularized reading.26 Our study focused on local newspaper coverage of Milwaukee radio talk
show host Michael McGee. McGee is a former Black Panther and Milwaukee
alderman who has, over the years, often been labeled a “demagogue” for a number of discursive practices associated with his advocacy on behalf of poor innercity African Americans. In particular, mainstream newspaper narratives
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attacked McGee for his lack of “deportment” and “statesmanship,” and thus dismissed his more salient social and economic messages. We interpreted his messages through theories of African American discourse, which helped us as
critics to reconfigure and apprehend the texts and contexts associated with his
discursive practices in a fresh light. McGee mounted a counternarrative to resist
mainstream narratives about himself and the local black community. In this
study, then, persuasive tactics traditionally identified with demagoguery are
reframed and reinterpreted as a unique African American form of democratic
participation.
Much of what passed for demagoguery in the past is now being reinterpreted, reconfigured, and recast. For example, J. Michael Hogan and Glen
Williams have challenged the “received view” of Huey Long as a southern
demagogue. They argue that some people who have been “[u]ncomfortable
with radical mass politics among poor, uneducated rural folk in the South”
have employed the term “demagogue” as an epithet rather than a technical
term. Indeed, for these authors, “Long’s reputation as a demagogue reflects a
prejudice grounded not in ideology, but in an intellectual aversion to his
indecorous, vituperative, and revivalistic brand of democratic populism.”27 As
Hogan and Williams remind the scholarly community, “To some, Long was a
hero. To others, he was a demagogue. To embrace one label over the other is to
oversimplify Long’s complex political persona. More than that, it is to take
sides in the perennial class struggle between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots.’”28
Even when scholars today reinterpret those whose credentials seem impeccable as demagogues, we learn not only about persuasive strategies and tactics,
but also receive new and expansive views about our democracy and our culture. James Darsey’s treatment of Joseph McCarthy, for example, reconfigures
McCarthyism’s “apocalyptic rhetoric as a response to the dissolution of community in America.”29 In finding his “fantastic moment,” McCarthy’s discursive conspiratorial hyperbole points audiences toward dark forces, evil
alliances, secret plots, and all manner of darkness “imposed from without.”30
Nothing is what it seems and all manner of signs are darkly indeterminate. The
sense of foreboding is palpable as the generic constraints of the fantastic
exploit our fears and lead us to an ineluctable moment of “hesitation between
belief and rejection, that moment suspended between the marvelous (the
extraordinary, but ultimately credible) and the uncanny (the bizarre and the
ultimately untrue).”31 In Darsey’s deft critical treatment, we find a richer and
deeper explanation than mere charges of demagoguery.
Studies such as Hogan and Williams’s and Darsey’s are also recasting our
knowledge of rhetorical democracy. As the so-called demagogic discursive
practices of the past are reinterpreted by new scholarship with new theoretical and methodological assumptions and approaches, we are coming to
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understand the rough-and-tumble of a liberal democracy in new ways. We
are also giving voice to new dimensions of rhetorical activity that have been
written off as inappropriate or anathema.
Rhetoricians who are directly involved in the process of interrogating and
reclaiming rhetorical democracy are revivifying our traditional ways of knowing. Some are even turning to the ancients to enhance their reclamation project. For example, Karen E. Whedbee’s examination of George Grote’s
influential nineteenth-century work A History of Greece reveals a vigorous
defense of Cleon and the Athenian demagogues.32 Historical treatments of
Greece written prior to Grote’s work portrayed Cleon as the quintessential
demagogue. As Whedbee makes clear, Cleon was treated as a dangerous “rabblerouser” and “his name was synonymous with deception, flattery, and emotional manipulation of the ‘ignorant Athenian mob.’” Grote’s historical
“defense of Athens depended in part on defending the demagogue and, by so
doing, vindicating popular oratory as a legitimate means of political decisionmaking.”33 Like Hogan and Williams’s protest of the treatment of Huey Long,
Grote’s revisionist ancient history rejects the view that Cleon was a demagogue. Indeed, according to Whedbee, for Grote, Cleon is better interpreted
“as a political hero who used rhetoric to challenge the authority of wealth and
unexamined tradition. Cleon’s expressions of political dissent opened space
for public deliberation and for rational consideration of alternative modes of
thought and conduct.” Indeed, Whedbee argues that “[i]n Grote’s analysis, the
rhetorical performances of demagogues like Cleon represented a kind of ‘critical rationality’ essential to achieving political liberty.”34 Moreover, Grote
“maintained that political authority can be legitimate only when it is submitted to freely and deliberately. But free and deliberate assent means that dissent
must always be kept open as a real option for individuals.”35 Such cues are
important to our joint realization of an engaged political community.
Whether the reformulation occurs from a renewed look at the ancients,
contemporary reinterpretations of rhetors that scholars and public alike once
labeled demagogues, taking into account new cultural understandings, reinterpreting protest rhetoric, initiating new attempts to understand the vernacular, or attempting to calibrate how audiences interpret figurative language in
everyday discourse, it seems clear that rhetorical scholars are mounting studies that are in fact engaged in the interrogation of our current rhetorical
republic. Whether one prefers to investigate rhetorical democracy, democratic
practices or products, or new democratic instantiations in the public sphere, or
simply tries to append an alternative meaning and power to so-called “demagogic” discourse, there is unique purchase in mounting and sustaining reinterpretations of those rhetors who traditionally have been labeled demagogues.
Rhetorical critics have been demonstrably unwilling to dismiss oppositional,
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divisive, or strident discourse as part and parcel of these revisionist accounts.
To my mind, this is a healthy development. Issues of democratic dissent are as
crucial to our common destiny as issues of democratic assent. Continued
study along these lines should enrich both theory and criticism while simultaneously bringing us new ways of seeing, interpreting, and enacting a vibrant
and expanded realization of the polis.
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